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ABSTRACT Market purchases of water rights for environmental purposes in the western
United States have involved purchases by public agencies of at least 88 850 acre feet of
water over the last five years. Annual water leasing for environmental purposes has been
more active, with 1.72 million acre feet leased in the western United States. The most
frequent reasons for these transactions are for wildlife (primarily waterfowl), recreation
and fisheries. The average price paid for a water right is $609 per acre foot, while it is
$30 per acre foot for an annual water lease. As evidenced by the ability of government
agencies to purchase water in voluntary transactions, environmental uses of water are
often competitive with many low-value agricultural crops in the western United States.
Introduction
In many countries there exists increasing competition over fully utilized water
supplies. In arid countries, traditional uses of water such as irrigation and
municipal and industrial uses often utilize all the available water, resulting in
dry stream beds, dropping aquifers and falling lake levels. Lakes in countries as
different as Russia and the United States are often drawn down to the detriment
of fisheries. In the United States, groundwater pumping by the states of Texas
and Nevada has so drawn down natural springs that two fish species are listed
as endangered under the US Endangered Species Act. Diversions from the
Colorado River in the southwestern United States result in highly saline water
deliveries to Mexico and a dying Colorado River delta ecosystem. Some rivers
are seriously depleted during summer periods to produce low-value crops such
as alfalfa, when economic analyses often show that keeping the water in-stream
for hydropower, fisheries, recreation and higher-value agriculture downstream
is more valuable (Watts et al., 2001).
Until recently, environmental values of water were not observable in the
marketplace. At first such environmental values were largely ignored, and all
the available water was allocated to market uses such as agricultural, municipal
and industrial uses. Now most western states in the United States have pro-
grammes or laws that recognize in-stream flow as a beneficial use. As will be
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seen in the transactions evidence, however, some states facilitate active im-
plementation of their in-stream flow laws more than others. Over the last two
decades economists have developed techniques to shadow price environmental
values of water. The methods include such approaches as the travel cost,
contingent valuation and hedonic price methods. Government agencies have
embraced these methods and incorporated them into their cost–benefit proce-
dures (US Water Resources Council, 1983). While the methods are widely used
by economists, there remains some suspicion among water development agen-
cies over the resulting values. In some cases, water development agencies’
failure to distinguish between financial and economic values of water results in
economic values without cash transactions being treated as ‘second-class’ values.
This sometimes leads to irrigation districts and hydropower producers being
asked to relinquish water for in-stream flow purposes reportedly of higher
economic value to counter with a ‘show me the money’ attitude.
Because most water in the western United States was allocated to off-stream
uses before in-stream values were formally recognized, protecting in-stream
flows often requires reallocation from these off-stream uses. Over the first part
of the 1990s what water reallocation took place generally followed a regulatory
process. For example, in California, the State Water Resources Control Board
amended Los Angeles’s water right so that more water would remain as
in-stream flow and go into Mono Lake (Loomis, 1995). However, administrative
reallocation is strongly opposed by existing off-stream water users (Gillilan &
Brown, 1997). For example, the USDA Forest Service has attempted to impose
in-stream flow requirements as a condition of permitting a utility company’s
dams on national forest lands, but the agency’s efforts have been met with vocal
opposition by Colorado’s traditional water users. Voluntary market transactions
meet with less opposition. In this spirit, the Colorado Attorney General has
recently proposed that federal agencies such as the USDA Forest Service should
use the federal Land and Water Conservation Fund to buy water rights for the
in-stream flows they desire (Salazar, 2001). As Colby (1990, p. 1116) notes,
“Where instream flow maintenance is recognized as a beneficial use so that
water rights may be held for that purpose, market transfers could become an
important means of accomplishing instream flow protection”.
This paper reports on the progress that has been made since 1990 in water
market transactions for in-stream flow in the western United States. In a sense,
the purpose of this paper is to show the water resource development community
the money. In the last few years, millions of dollars have been spent by public
agencies and non-profit organizations to purchase water rights or lease water
for in-stream flow purposes. This paper documents these transactions in the
western United States, where such water market transactions for environmental
purposes such as fisheries, recreation and wetlands have been most active. These
transactions provide some indication that the shadow prices estimated using
non-market valuation methods reflect real value, which agencies or organiza-
tions are willing to back with real money.
Water Transactions for Environmental Purposes
Water market transactions may occur as personal negotiations or via brokers,
over the phone or, in some states, over the Internet. If there are so few market
transactions in a given area such that a ‘going’ price is not available, negotiated
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transactions determine prices and the specific conditions of the sale (Colby,
1990). Because market transactions obtain water through voluntary action, water
right holders are fully compensated for selling or leasing their water rights.
The federal government, state agencies, private organizations and individual
farmers are all involved in these markets and have gained extensive experience
with market transfers. As an example of federal government water market
involvement consider the Lahontan Valley (near Fallon, Nevada) water market,
which was formalized by the US Water Rights Settlement Action (PL101–618). In
this water market, the US Fish and Wildlife Service was offering a price of $500
per acre foot for a water right and had acquired 40 water rights for a total of
nearly 19 000 acre feet of water (Ise & Sunding, 1998).
Since water rights and water laws are very complex, most buyers perform a
legal evaluation prior to purchase. The US Bureau of Reclamation has an
extensive screening process that usually includes a title search, owner
verification, seniority assessment, a review of historical cropping patterns and
verification of acres irrigated over the last five years. Not every evaluation is as
extensive as the Bureau’s but it is very important to know the quantity, seniority
and validity of a water right prior to the final water market transaction (Landry,
1998).
Types of Water Transactions
There are three different types of acquisitions that are available in a water
transaction: leases, purchases and donations. This paper only discusses leases
and purchases because only these reveal market values. A donation is free of
direct market value (although there may be tax savings). A lease is a temporary
contract that provides flexibility and has at least two advantages. First, leases
provide an opportunity for water right holders to become comfortable with the
idea of in-stream flow marketing. Water right holders have a chance to see how
a lease affects their water needs and organizations can assess how effective the
quantity of in-stream flow leased has been in achieving their environmental
objective. Secondly, leases provide an opportunity for organizations to deter-
mine whether the effects of water transfers on local communities are significant
or not. Many critics are concerned that shifting water away from irrigation may
erode a community’s economic base. Leases also offer flexibility to accommodate
particular needs of both buyers and sellers. A variety of lease options are
available, from standard annual and multi-year leases to dry-year and split-sea-
son leases. With dry-year options, arrangements are made in advance for access
to water during a drought period. Split-season leases allow a portion of a water
right to be used for irrigation early in the year, leaving the remaining portion of
the right for in-stream or environmental use later in the summer (Landry, 1998).
Purchases of water rights involve permanent transfers that offer long-term
solutions to a specific water-related environmental problem. Most private
groups acquiring water for environmental uses prefer water right purchases to
annual water leases. For example, the Oregon Water Trust has relied on leases
in the past but considers them an interim device and is shifting its focus to water
right purchases (Landry, 1998). Many organizations agree that purchases are the
best option for streams that have chronic flow problems, and also for habitat for
species that can only be saved with long-term water flows made possible by
obtaining water rights.
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Spatial Extent of Water Markets
Most water market transactions do not occur in fully competitive markets, with
numerous buyers and sellers all having perfect information. At the present stage
of western water market development, water transactions often involve a few
buyers seeking out willing sellers from among a few individuals who have
senior water rights on the particular river of interest. Thus, in some cases, such
as a small watershed, a traditional competitive market does not exist because
there may be very few sellers who have water rights on the river where the
agency or group wishes to increase in-stream flows for a particular fish or
environmental purpose. In other cases, such as providing water for large areas
of wetlands in the Fallon area of Nevada, there are many irrigators who could
supply the water, and more competition is likely on the supply side. In large
river basins like the Snake River, the US Bureau of Reclamation can identify a
multitude of water right holders who could provide the water, although the
Bureau may be the dominant buyer. Thus, the extent of the market, or whether
the markets are ‘thin’ with few buyers and sellers, or competitive with numerous
buyers and sellers, will depend on the size of the watershed and the environ-
mental purposes for which the water is being obtained.
Therefore, we can have either a monopolistic market (one seller) or a monop-
sonistic market (one buyer) for water rights. Although the market prices ob-
served in our data may not necessarily be competitive prices, they are
nonetheless the amounts that a willing buyer and seller agreed to. The prices
provide an indication of the marginal benefit of the water for the environmental
purpose, as well as the opportunity cost to the seller. As these transactions
become more commonplace in large water basins, it will be interesting to see if
prices fall to more competitive levels.
Data
The Water Strategist journal was the primary source of information on environ-
mental transactions for this analysis (Stratecon, Inc., 1995–99). The journal
reports on water marketing, finance, legislation and litigation. Since January
1995, there has been a special section in the journal called ‘Transactions’, which
lists monthly purchases, leases and exchanges of water in the western United
States. The ‘Transactions’ section documents the purchaser and the supplier of
the water, where the water is located, the transaction purpose, the price and
amount of water transferred and the status of the transaction. There is also a
brief summary included, which may provide further details about the trans-
action. The journals used for this analysis ranged from January 1995 up to
December 1999. The journals were quarterly issues until January 1999 and now
are published on a monthly basis. The analysis began with January 1995 data
because this was when the environmental transactions began to be fully docu-
mented in terms of environmental purposes.
The authors also located additional water purchase transactions for environ-
mental purposes in Simon (1998), who reported several water transactions by US
Department of Interior agencies. Using this paper and the 28 issues of Water
Strategist, the authors catalogued 84 complete transactions. Ten of the 11 western
states had fully documented transactions plus one Midwest state, Nebraska. The
number of transactions per state ranged from one lease in Montana, and one
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Table 1. Summary of water lease transactions in the western
USA (1999 dollars)
Annual water Average quantity
lease price leased Number of
($/acre foot) (acre feet) transactions
Arizona 41 2 000 1
California 48 40 109 24
Colorado 11 2 298 6
Idaho 19 84 586 7
Montana 2 72 270 1
New Mexico 6.50 23 500 2
Oregon 114 4 463 6
Washington 34 1 869 5
Source: Summarized from Water Strategist, January 1995 to December 1999.
purchase in Nebraska, to 24 for California. Tables 1 and 2 provide the complete
list. The market values per acre foot of water for all of the transactions before
1999 were inflated to 1999 US dollars by using the Consumer Price Index.
Results
The water quantity weighted average price per acre foot of water in the study
was $609 for a water right and $30 for a one-year water lease. Tables 1 and 2
present a summary of the water right purchases and water leases. Idaho
represents the largest average quantity of water leased and purchased (mostly
for out-migration flows for salmon). Nevada was a close second for water
purchases, with a great deal of water being purchased by the US Fish and
Wildlife Service for wetland maintenance and restoration for the Stillwater
National Wildlife Refuge near Fallon, Nevada. California had the largest number
of water lease transactions.
It is interesting to note that many of these lease values per acre foot are similar
to non-market recreation values of in-stream flows estimated using the travel
Table 2. Summary of water right purchase transactions in the
western USA (1999 dollars)
Water rights Average quantity
price bought Number of
($/acre foot) (acre feet) transactions
Arizona 42 1157 4
California 2817 399 1
Colorado 1088 91 10
Idaho 131 8258 3
Nebraska 794 1288 1
Nevada 995 7315 5
Oregon 243 3858 5
Utah 1200 316 2
Washington 830 361 1
Source: Summarized from Water Strategist, January 1995 to December 1999.
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Table 3. Monetary values paid for water right purchases and water leases for
environmental purposes within the western USA
Water rightsa Water leasesa
Percentage Value Number Percentage Annual
Number of of ($/acre of of $/acre
transactions transactions foot) transactions transactions foot
In-stream flow 18 56 753 35 67 45.82
T&E species 7 22 1010 6 12 58.32
Riparian 2 6 42 0 0 NA
Fish 10 31 511 29 56 40.82
Recreation 11 34 1245 4 8 9.80
Water quality 3 9 917 0 0 NA
Wetlands 2 6 1111 7 13 55.08
Wildlife 12 38 1019 10 19 35.53
Ecosystem services 11 34 1061 7 13 40.70
NA, Not applicable.
a Note that the percentages add up to more than 100% as buyers indicated more than one purpose on
several sales.
Source: Summarized from Water Strategist, January 1995 to December 1999.
cost and contingent valuation methods as summarized in the literature (Loomis,
1986). Some of the market values in Tables 1 and 2 are quite high, with Oregon
recording an average annual lease rate of $114 per acre foot. In Oregon the
emphasis of water market transactions has been on providing water for salmon
and steelhead recovery, and recently for bull trout habitat flows. Not only do
these prices represent the value at the margin for environmental purposes, but
they also provide some insight regarding opportunity costs to farmers to lease
water. As can be seen, the values are fairly low in Colorado and Idaho, and so
the opportunity costs of providing in-stream flows in some areas of these states
are rather low.
Environmental Purposes of Water Transactions
As shown in Table 3, the most frequent purpose stated for water right purchases
was the general reason of increasing in-stream flow (56%). However, the more
specific reasons for water right purchases that were commonly listed included
wildlife (often waterfowl), ecosystem restoration, recreation, fish and threatened
and endangered (T&E) species.
For water leasing, in-stream flows were also the most common reason stated,
but in contrast to water right purchases, the second most common reason for
water leasing was fisheries. Water leasing was used about half as often as
purchases for T&E species, recreation, wildlife and ecosystem services.
Table 3 also presents the monetary values paid for water purchases and leases
in the western states by environmental purpose. Several water purchases were
in the range of $1000 per acre foot for T&E species, water quality, recreation,
wetlands, wildlife and ecosystem services. In contrast, annual water leases were
in the range of $40–50 per acre foot for most uses. The implied discount rate is
approximately 5% to equate annual lease values with water right purchase
values.
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With several thousand acre feet being purchased and thousands of acre feet
being leased each year at prices greater than competing agricultural values, the
water development community has clearly been shown the money in environ-
mental uses of water.
Comparison with Non-market Value Estimates of Water
Although market transactions with real money changing hands speak louder to
water managers than do shadow prices of water estimated by non-market
valuation methods, nonetheless the two types of values are in closer agreement
than managers might suspect. Brown (1991) has tabulated many of the
non-market recreation benefit estimates derived from travel cost and contingent
valuation methods. Brown (1991) reports that many of the annual benefit
estimates are in the $1–12 per acre foot range, with $25 per acre foot being the
most frequent high value. Comparing these estimates with those in Table 3
yields some fairly close comparisons. Specifically, recreational lease values are
reported in Table 3 as $9.80 per acre foot, quite close to the majority of per acre
foot values reported by Brown (1991). Annualizing the water right purchases for
recreation at the implied 5% discount rate yields a value of $62 per acre foot, a
value greater than the two higher-end studies reported by Brown (1991). The
point here for water managers is that non-market valuation techniques for
recreation are providing estimates fairly close to, and perhaps on the conserva-
tive side of, what public agencies are actually paying for water for in-stream
flow for recreation.
Conclusions
Water transactions for environmental purposes are becoming more frequent and
commanding large monetary values. More than $100 million of water has been
bought or leased in the last five years in the western United States for a wide
variety of environmental purposes including recreation, fisheries and waterfowl.
The fact that public agencies and non-profit organizations have been able to
purchase water in voluntary transactions suggests that environmental values of
water now exceed the value of marginal quantities of irrigation water in some
locations of the western United States, otherwise farmers would not sell some of
their water rights. Water markets for environmental purposes will help facilitate
the reallocation of water from older, lower-valued uses to new, higher-valued
uses. As water markets evolve and the values of water resources are revealed
through market transactions, those values will further demonstrate that environ-
mental uses of water are valuable to society and should be recognized as
beneficial uses, on an equal basis with traditional uses of water.
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